New York Probate and Estate Administration Lawyer Blog

Published on: January 10, 2015

Court Rules on Notice of Pendency

by Stephen Bilkis

A Probate Lawyer said the plaintiffs, TM Inc. and Mr. D commenced this action against the defendants, Mr. and Mr. X alleging that the defendants failed to pay a real estate brokerage commission. The file reveals that after commencing this action, the plaintiffs filed with the Richmond County Clerk a “Notice of Pendency” against the defendants’ real property located at 1XX Winant Avenue, Staten Island, New York in order to secure payment of the real estate broker’s commission claimed due in this matter. The notice of pendency was dated on April 25, 2005 the same date of the summons and complaint. The plaintiffs’ filing of the notice of pendency with the County Clerk on April 26, 2005 necessitated the defendants seeking an order to show cause to cancel the lispendens (Annotation at the back of the title as to the pending issue involving the said property) of record. A hearing on the issue resulted in an order dated May 6, 2005 canceling the notice of pendency.

The court made a finding that plaintiffs’ complaint is for breach of contract and it is not one that seeks a judgment which would “affect the title to, or possession, use or enjoyment of, real property” as required by CPLR 6501 as a basis for filing a notice of pendency.

Defendants have asserted two counterclaims; one alleges that the plaintiffs have violated the Federal Debt Collection Practice Act (FDCPA) and the second alleges that the plaintiffs improperly filed the notice of pendency. Plaintiffs also seek to dismiss two affirmative defenses of the defendants, one alleging a failure of documentary evidence while the second asserts the equitable defense of unclean hands. The defendants have opposed the motion by filing a cross-motion seeking dismissal of the complaint.

Published on: January 9, 2015

Plaintiff Moves to Vacate Prior Court Order Regarding Settlement of Proceeds

by Stephen Bilkis

A Probate Lawyer said this matter arises out of a fatal, three-vehicle accident which occurred on September 25, 2006 on Interstate 87 in Ulster County, New York. At the time of the accident, the decedent was a front seat passenger in a vehicle being operated by defendant AS which, at the time in question, was proceeding north on I-87 near the Kingston exit. At this point in time, AS was allegedly cut-off by a pick- up truck towing a horse trailer (owned and operated by defendants L and RRs, respectively) which attempted to make a U-turn from the northbound shoulder of I-87, purportedly ten feet in front of the AS vehicle. After contact with the pick-up truck, AS’s Jeep was apparently propelled into the southbound lanes of I-87, where it was struck by a vehicle owned by defendant Y and operated by defendant LJ.

There is no dispute that Mr. V died as a result of the massive injuries which he sustained in this accident. However, as shall presently appear, a dispute has arisen as to the accuracy of AS’s claim that the decedent was asleep at the time of the initial impact and, therefore, incapable of experiencing any degree of pre-impact terror or conscious pain and suffering in the above accident.

An Estate Lawyer said that on his motion for leave to intervene pursuant to CPLR 1012, 1013, CX contends that the Order of this Court, dated August 10, 2009, should be vacated pursuant to CPLR 5015, and the matter removed or transferred to the Surrogate’s Court, Richmond County, for further proceedings to judicially account for the settlement proceeds. The order in question provides, in relevant part, for the settlement of plaintiffs’ cause of action for wrongful death for the sum of $300,000.00 and the voluntary discontinuance, with prejudice, of decedent’s personal injury action. In support of his motion, CX maintains that this court’s allocation order is invalid since all of the interested parties who might be adversely effected were not joined in the compromise proceeding.

Published on: January 6, 2015

Court Decides if Plaintiff has Standing to Bring Case

by Stephen Bilkis

An Probate Lawyer said that the records reflect that a mortgagor executed a note and mortgage in favor of a company. in the principal amount of $167,475.00, secured by the premises located in New York. As alleged in the affidavit, the Vice President of Loan Documentation of the mortgagee’s Bank, the note and mortgage fell into default upon the mortgagor’s failure to make the required payment due on August 1, 2010 and thereafter. Insofar as it appears, the borrower had died intestate. Letters of Administration for the Estate of the deceased borrower were subsequently issued by the Surrogate’s Court, naming one of the decedent’s two sons in taking charge of Estate Administration. The company commenced an action to foreclose the mortgage in the County, where the property is located.The two sons answered, denying the material allegations in the complaint and asserting several affirmative defenses, including the company’s purported lack of standing.

The court ruled that it is well settled that on a motion for summary judgment in an action to foreclosure a mortgage, a plaintiff/mortgagee, as here, establishes its prima facie right to judgment as a matter of law through the production of the relevant mortgage, the unpaid note and an affidavit attesting to the mortgagor’s default. However, where standing has been drawn into question, it is incumbent upon a plaintiff/mortgagee to prove its standing in order to be entitled to any relief. “A plaintiff has standing where it is both the holder or assignee of the subject mortgage and the holder or assignee of the underlying note at the time the action is commenced”.

A Westchester County Probate Lawyer said that in the case at bar, the primary affidavit in support of summary judgment is subscribed by a Vice President of Loan Documentation of the Bank, who affirms, based on unstated sources of personal knowledge and a review of “the books and records maintained in the ordinary course of business in serving this loan, that the Bank, is in possession of the promissory note, endorsed in blank and confirms that the mortgagee was in possession of the promissory note prior to the commencement of this action. While the foregoing, in and of itself, is lacking in sufficient factual detail to establish standing prior to the commencement of this action, the various exhibits submitted therewith include a copy of the subject note indorsed by the company to the order of the corporation., and then, in blank, by the latter. Moreover, although neither indorsement is dated, these papers also contain a written assignment of the mortgage by the original lender to the corporation, and recorded in the County prior to the commencement of this action. More important, however, on the issue of standing is the fact that this assignment of mortgage also provides for an assignment of “the notes therein described or referred to, the money due and to become due thereon with interest, and all rights accrued or to accrue under said Real Estate Mortgage”. Since it is undisputed that the Bank, is the successor by merger of the corporation, the documents constitute prima facie evidence that the Bank, was the lawful owner of both the note and mortgage at the time that the action was commenced.

Published on: January 5, 2015

Court Determines if Charging Lien Exists if Favor of Former Lawyer

by Stephen Bilkis

A Probate Lawyer said that from the records, the genesis of this litigation arose when a lawyer was representing a corporation in regard to its purchase of the premises pursuant to a written contract. The contract was dated and was an “all cash deal.” The court notes that unlike contracts in another County, the real estate contract is actually dated. The transaction was scheduled on a specific date but did not when allegedly the seller became disenchanted with the terms and upset that the lawyer was representing his sister in regard to her interest in this transaction and their mother’s estate. The owner’s sister, sometime later apparently issued a power of attorney in favor of the lawyer. Why this was relevant is a mystery in that the seller is the owner individually and not an estate. Also the seller had his own independent counsel in negotiating the contract of sale to the corporation. In any case it is conceded that the seller refused to close title as scheduled. A litigation commenced to compel specific performance. This resulted in the order of the Supreme Court, directing the seller to honor the contract and close title within thirty days of the order. In spite of achieving the legal goal for which the lawyer had been directed to commence the litigation, for some reason the corporation did not seek to enforce the judgment and compel the seller to close.

As Estate Lawyer said that later on, the corporation notified the lawyer that his services would no longer be needed to complete the closing with the seller. A second lawyer became the attorney for the corporation in regard to the purchase. At the closing of title, a written escrow agreement was entered into between the former lawyer and the principal of the corporation. The agreement directed the second lawyer to hold the sum of $10,000.00 in escrow pending resolution of the former lawyer’s claim for the legal fees incurred in representing the corporation in the contract negotiations and subsequent litigation. The agreement recites that Schwartz is asserting a “charging lien” in regard to the services he rendered on behalf of the corporation.

A Nassau County Probate Lawyer said the issues presented are; whether or not a Charging Lien Exist in Favor of the former lawyer? Whether or not retainer agreement is required?

Published on: January 4, 2015

Court Questions if Venue is Proper in Case

by Stephen Bilkis

In this action for medical malpractice, the claimants are represented by the executor of their estate.

A Probate Lawyer said the records show that one of the accused has moved the medical malpractice action to change venue pursuant to CPLR section 510(1), claiming that claimants improperly placed venue based on the current New York residence of a co-accused doctor, rather than on his residence in another county at the time of the alleged negligence. The complainant opposes, arguing that the doctor’s current residence is a proper basis for placing venue in New York County.

Hence, the issue is whether or not the venue in this action is improperly laid.

Published on: January 3, 2015

Court Determines if Courts Prior Jury Verdict was Proper

by Stephen Bilkis

A Probate Lawyer said that the four motions made by all of the parties to set aside the jury verdict of March 22, 2008 and to enter judgments as a matter of law pursuant to CPLR §4404(a) are denied in part and granted in part.

This case arose from a July 1, 2000 motor vehicle accident where a 1998 Ford Explorer, a sport utility vehicle (“SUV”) rolled over, three and three quarter times resulting in two deaths and serious injuries to three other passengers. The vehicle was manufactured and designed by the defendant, Ford Motor Company. Ford Motor Credit Co. was the owner and lessor of the SUV. The driver and lessee, SM, died in the accident. The front seat passenger, G, was SM’s son. He sustained physical and serious emotional injuries as a result of the accident. Two of the rear seated passengers were SM’s grandsons, who were also G’s sons: B, who died one day after the accident, and E, who survived with physical and extreme emotional distress as a result of the accident. The third rear seated passenger, S, sustained serious physical, head and psychiatric injuries and settled with Ford Motor Credit Company on June 19, 2007, prior to trial for the amount of $1,750,000. S discontinued his products liability actions against Ford Motor Company.

An Estate Lawyer said that after three weeks of testimony, the jury found that the roof support system of the 1998 Ford Explorer SUV was defectively designed and found Ford liable in strict liability and negligent design, both of which were substantial factors in causing the driver, SM’s death. The jury found that the acceleration cable of the speed control system was not defective. The jury found that the two children, E and B, were not wearing their seatbelts and therefore concluded that the rear seat belts were not defectively designed causing them to unlatch upon a sustained impact, as plaintiffs demonstrated.

Published on: January 2, 2015

Court Determines if Prior Contract Existed

by Stephen Bilkis

A Probate Lawyer said the plaintiff-Claimant, Mr. W, commenced this day small claims action against defendant, RAL, alleging that owing to the defendant improperly listing the premises claimant purchased as having city sewers when it did not, claimant was forced to incur the cost of installing a sewer line after closing.

Claimant testified that he was induced to initially look at, and then eventually purchase, the premises because the house was listed as having city sewers. Defendant is a licensed real estate broker and was the listing broker on the sale. Claimant stated that he was only interested in homes that had a city sewer and was shown the house by another real estate brokerage firm. Claimant asserts that after he closed on the house in March 2013, he learned that the property did not have city sewers but in fact had a septic tank system. Because the City of New York installed sewers in Woodrow Road at that time, claimant was required to spend $4,200.00 to run a sewer line from the city line in the street to his house.

A New York Estate Lawyer said that there are several problems with the claimant’s allegations. First, he testified that he worked for the New York City Department of Environmental Protection and does sewer maintenance as part of his job. Second, both he and the defendant broker’s witness testified that there were contractors installing sewer lines in the Woodrow Road area when the house was listed and when the claimant visited the premises on more than one occasion. Yet no one thought to make inquires to why the streets were being dug up. Third, claimant hired a structural engineer to prepare a report prior to entering into the contract. That report was not put into evidence. Fourth, claimant did not produce the contract of sale which he entered into with the seller which may have had a representation as to the existence of city sewers, private sewers, septic tanks or cesspools. Fifth, claimant did not produce his title report which if done in the standard manner as prepared in Richmond County, would have included municipal searches marked for information only disclosing any city related water and sewer charges assessed against the property. The lack of this information in the title report should have triggered an inquiry by all parties to the transaction. A certificate of occupancy search which may have contained information in that regard, is also a customary document provided by a municipal search.

Published on: December 18, 2014

Plaintiff Seeks to Increase Damage Amount

by Stephen Bilkis

Probate Lawyers said the defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Richmond County, which granted the plaintiff’s motion to remove the case from the Civil Court of the City of New York to the Supreme Court, Richmond County, to amend the complaint to set forth a cause of action for wrongful death and to increase the amount of damages requested.

Following an automobile accident which occurred on July 10, 1971, the plaintiff brought this action in the Civil Court of the City of New York, Richmond County, on May 24, 1972, alleging negligence on the part of the defendants and requesting a total of $14,000 damages for injury to personal property, for personal injuries sustained by his son, aged 16, and for consequential damages sustained by the plaintiff-father.

An Estate lawyer said that the two automobiles of the defendants collided, sending one of them into the parked automobile in which the child was sitting. It is conceded that he died of Leukemia on August 14, 1972. On June 25, 1974, the plaintiff, as administrator of his son’s estate, moved in the Richmond Supreme Court for leave to amend the complaint so as to assert an action for wrongful death, to increase the amount of damages requested by the plaintiff, both as administrator and parent, and to remove the case from the Civil Court to the Supreme Court, which would have jurisdiction over the increased amount claimed.

Published on: December 17, 2014

Court Decides Case Involving Probate and Bankruptcy Proceedings

by Stephen Bilkis

A Probate Lawyer said in this Estate action, the defendant moves to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint or in the alternative an order staying the action as against him. The co-defendant cross-moves to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint or in the alternative an order staying the action against her. The co-defendants cross- move to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint as against them, as well as an award of costs and disbursements. The motions are granted to the extent that this matter shall be stayed pending the completion of the federal bankruptcy proceedings.

A Estate lawyer said that the defendant is a principal of a Company that has its principal place of business at New York. It is acknowledged that co-defendant was a member of company. But in support of her cross-motion to dismiss, she submits a copy of an Agreement of Sale dated June 8, 2012 wherein Defendant agrees to buy her portion of the company.

The plaintiff alleges that on or about July 27, 2011, the company entered into an agreement (Treasury Management Agreement). This agreement set forth the terms of the company’s use of Funds Transfer/Wire and Remote Check Deposit Service. The funds transfer service allowed the company to make wire transfers from its accounts with the plaintiff to accounts held at other banks. The remote check deposit service allowed Richmond Wholesale to scan and deposit checks remotely from it’s office.

Published on: December 16, 2014

Court Considers Case Reqarding Law of Perpetuities

by Stephen Bilkis

A Probate Lawyer said the question presented on this record is whether the trusts created by the will of CMR, dated June 27, 1867, are valid within the law of perpetuities, or are void for remoteness. There can be no doubt that if the testatrix, at her death, was the absolute owner of the estate embraced in the trusts, they were valid both in respect of their purposes and duration. In general character they are trusts to apply the rents, profits, and income of the trust-estate for the support and maintenance of two children of the testatrix during their lives, respectively, with remainder, on the death of either, of the share of the one so dying, to his heirs and next of kin, except that in case of the death of either child during minority, and without issue, the whole estate is to be held in trust for the survivor during life, with remainder to his heirs and next of kin; and in case of the death of both children during minority and without issue, then, on the death of the longest liver, the whole estate is given absolutely to designated beneficiaries. Under the will the estate was to vest in absolute ownership, at the furthest, within the compass of the lives of the two children. The share of each child, provided he attained majority, would be liberated from the trust on his death, and the suspension of that share would in that event be but for one life only; but if either child should die during minority without issue, there would be a further suspension of the absolute ownership of his share during the life of the survivor. As to each share, therefore, there might be a suspension for two lives, but this would be within the limit allowed by law.

An Estate Lawyer said there would be no difficulty in sustaining the limitations in the will, if the period of suspension in this case is reckoned from the death of the testatrix, and the will only is to be regarded in determining the validity of the trusts. The statutory limit of suspension of the power of alienation of real estate is two lives in being at the creation of the estate, and a minority, and substantially the same rule applies to limitations of personal property. By another section of the statute it is declared that the delivery of the grant, where an expectant estate is created by grant, and where it is created by devise, the death of the testator shall be deemed the time of the creation of the estate. If nothing is to be considered in this case except the terms of the will, and these two sections of the statute, no doubt could be entertained of the validity of the trusts in the will; but if the will was the execution of a power of appointment vested in the testatrix, and not an exercise by her, as the owner of the property devised and bequeathed, of the jus disponendi, incident to ownership, a new element is introduced, and the validity of the trusts in the will is to be considered in view of the trust-deed of January 6, 1853, and the provisions of the statute of powers. By section 128 of that statute it is declared that ‘the period during which the absolute right of alienation may be suspended by an instrument in execution of a power shall be computed, not from the date of the instrument, but from the time of the creation of the power. Section 129 declares that no estate or interest can be given or limited to any person by an instrument in execution of a power which such person could not be capable of taking under the instrument by which the power was granted; and by section 105 it is declared, in substance, that a power reserved is subject to the provisions of the article in the same manner as a power granted.

A Westchester County Lawyer said it is claimed in behalf of the respondents that the will of Mrs. CMR was merely an execution of a power of appointment reserved in the trust-deed of January 6, 1853, made between the testatrix (then CMF) of the first part, and GSR and others of the second part, and that, construing the will in connection with the trust-deed and the provisions of the statute of powers, the trusts created by the will contravened the statute, for the reason that they were limited upon the lives of persons not in being at the creation of the power, viz., upon the lives of the two children of the testatrix, who, though living when the will was made, were not born until long after the trust-deed creating the power had been executed. The consequence is claimed to follow that the will was an unlawful attempt to suspend the power of alienation upon a contingency not authorized, viz., the lives of persons not in being at the time from which, by section 128 of the statute of powers, the suspension must be computed. The trust-deed was made in contemplation of the marriage of the settlor, CMF, with GSR. Its leading purposes were to secure to the settlor the income of her property for her own benefit during the marriage, free from the control, disposition, debts, or incumbrances of her husband, and to secure the principal to her, if she survived her husband; or, in case she should die during coverture, to her appointees by will; or, if she should make no appointment, to such persons as at her death would be her heirs, under the laws of New York, as if all the property was real estate.