New York Probate and Estate Administration Lawyer Blog

Published on: May 6, 2015

Court Interprets the Provisions of a Trust

by Stephen Bilkis

New York Probate Lawyers this is an uncontested proceeding for reformation of Article FIFTH of decedent’s last will and testament dated November 21, 1979, as amended by Article II of a codicil thereto dated March 24, 1982 (collectively, the “will”). Decedent died on December 12, 1984. The will was admitted to probate by decree of this court.

A Kings Probate lawyer said that Petitioner, the sister of the decedent, is a co-trustee of the trust created under Article FIFTH of the will (the “Trust”) for the benefit of decedent’s son, who suffers from chronic physical disabilities, including malfunctioning kidneys, for which he is receiving dialysis treatment. On July 14, 2006, following the death of the decedent, who had been serving as co-trustee with petitioner, successor letters of trusteeship were issued by this court to Bonnie Linzer, who is petitioner’s daughter as well as a remainderman of the trust.

A New York Estate Lawyer said that under Article III of the codicil, a trustee who is also a beneficiary of the trust is prohibited from (1) exercising discretion to pay or not to pay income or principal from the trust; (2) determining whether a beneficiary of the trust is disabled; (3) terminating any trust or life estate thereunder; and (4) exercising discretion to allocate receipts or expenses between principal and income. Petitioner and the daughter, who are remaindermen of the trust as well as the co-trustees, are thus unable to act in respect to these decisions.

Published on: May 5, 2015

Court Looks at Will Construction Issue

by Stephen Bilkis

Probate Lawyers said that according to a Kings County Estate Attorney a Judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, dated July 6, 1966, was reversed, with $30 costs and disbursements; plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment granted; and action remanded to the Special Term for the making and entry of an appropriate judgment declaring rights in accordance with the views set forth herein.

A Kings County Probate Lawyer said one Mrs. M died on December 1, 1934 and her last will and testament was duly admitted to probate. The critical provision of the will, with respect to this action for a declaratory judgment, devised her large plot in Greenwood Cemetery to defendant, the Cemetery corporation, with the direction that her remains and those of her late husband be interred there; and further that ‘until the limitation of interments is reached, the remains of my children and my stepchildren and their respective husbands or wives, and their children and their respective husbands or wives, may be interred in the said lot of land, and that interments in the said lot be restricted to the persons so designated.’

A New York Estate Lawyer said that according to a Kings County Estate Lawyer, the Plaintiffs seek to include in the class entitled to burial all descendants and step-descendants and their respective spouses ‘until the limitation of interments is reached.’ Defendant argues that the will limits the class to first and second generation descendants and step-descendants and their respective spouses.

Published on: May 4, 2015

Petitioner Files an Appeal in Will Contest Proceeding

by Stephen Bilkis

A New York Probate Lawyer said that, this is an appeal from an order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Second Judicial Department (207 App. Div. 388,202 N. Y. Supp. 201), entered December 7, 1923, which affirmed a decree of the Kings County Surrogate’s Court admitting to probate a paper propounded as the last will and testament of the deceased.

A Kings Estate Litigation Lawyer said that, another case is a motion to dismiss an appeal from an order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Second Judicial Department (202 App. Div. 843,194 N. Y. Supp. 978), entered July 21, 1922, which unanimously affirmed a decree of the Kings County Surrogate’s Court admitting to probate a paper propounded as the last will and testament of the deceased deceased. The motion was made upon the ground that permission to appeal had not been obtained.

The only question was as to whether the will was duly executed, one of the witnesses testifying that there was no publication thereof.

Published on: May 3, 2015

Petitioner Files an Application for an Order Extending the Statute of Limitations

by Stephen Bilkis

New York Probate Lawyers said this is an application for an Order extending the statute of limitations to allow the petitioner to commence an Article 78 proceeding against the State Tax Commission (Commission).

The Audit Division of the Commission, on December 20, 1979, issued a Notice of Determination and Demand for Payment of Sales and Use Taxes Due for the period June 1, 1976 through August 31, 1979. Petitioner filed a petition for revision of that determination and for refund of sales and use taxes under Articles 28 and 29 of the Tax Law. A hearing was held on November 21, 1985 at which petitioner appeared. A Decision was made on May 28, 1986 which modified the Determination, but left an amount due of $83,884.58.

A New York Estate Lawyer said by letter dated May 28, 1986, the Commission notified petitioner of the Decision and advised that petitioner had now exhausted his right of review at the administrative level. Pursuant to section(s) 1138 of the Tax Law, a proceeding in court to review an adverse decision by the State Tax Commission may be instituted only under Article 78 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules, and must be commenced in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Albany County, within 4 months from the date of this notice.

Published on: May 2, 2015

Court Discusses Contruction of a Residuary Trust

by Stephen Bilkis

A New York Probate Lawyer said the petitioner, the surviving trustee of a trust created on January 21, 1932, by and for the benefit of one Mrs. W, makes application for settlement of its account and asks for a construction whether the whole or any part of a legacy of $20,000 bequeathed under article fourth of the will of the donee, is payable from the corpus of the trust.

A New York Estate Lawyer said the pursuant to the trust agreement, the settlor, Mrs. W, reserved to herself the right to receive the income therefrom and directed that upon her request the trustee should pay over to her any part of the principal up to the sum of $50,000. In addition to the above, she reserved the power ‘to modify, alter or revoke this agreement, in whole or in part, to withdraw any of the principal of the trust fund therefrom in addition to the aforesaid $50,000.’ The agreement also provided that upon her death the principal should be ‘paid out and disposed of in such manner as the settlor might direct by any last will and testament made by her effectual at the time of her death.’

The settlor died on October 26, 1955, leaving a last will and testament dated January 20, 1949, which was admitted to probate. Paragraph fourth of the will provides: ‘As my adopted daughters, benefitted by the terms of the will of my late husband and my granddaughter, A, did not, she having been born after the execution of said will, I give and bequeath to my said granddaughter, A the sum of Twenty Thousand ($20,000) Dollars.’

Published on: May 1, 2015

Petitioners Seek Determination as to Disposition of Property

by Stephen Bilkis

A Probate Lawyer said that in this proceeding the executors seek a determination as to the validity and effect of the disposition of property described in testator’s will and authorization to sell the real property of which testator died seized. Testator’s will dated April 18, 1956 was admitted to probate in this Court on August 7, 1959.

After providing for the payment of administration expenses, testator in paragraphs ‘Second’ and ‘Third’ of his will devised a parcel of real property to his brother, H, and another parcel to his son-in-law, ‘absolutely’. In paragraphs ‘Fourth’ to ‘Tenth’ inclusive, testator bequeathed general legacies to two nieces and five churches. Paragraph ‘Eleventh’, which is the residuary clause, disposed of the remainder of testator’s estate, both real and personal, as follows: (a) sixty percent (60%) to his said brother, H, and (b) forth percent (40%) to his son-in-law, O (one of the petitioner herein); and in paragraph ‘Twelfth’ directed that in the event his brother H predeceased him, then ‘one-half of his remaining share be distributed amongst the above enumerated five Churches equally, and the balance to be given to my son-in-law, O.’

A New York Estate Lawyer said that under paragraph ‘Thirteenth’ testator provided that all payments be made from ‘cash assets’ at the time of his death and in the event the cash was not sufficient, then ‘distribution of these cash bequests be made on a proportionate basis.’ The will in paragraph ‘Fourteenth’ further provided that the executors are ‘not to attempt to dispose of any of my realty until two (2) years after my death’ and thereafter the executors were to exercise ‘their discretion’ to sell or otherwise dispose of the real property. Testator also provided in paragraph ‘Fourteenth’ of the will that ‘If, further, there is not sufficient sums to make the payments as mentioned in paragraph ‘Twelfth’, then I direct that as soon as any sales of realty are made, that first the specific bequests be paid and thereafter distribution be made to my surviving distributees.’ H predeceased the testator leaving no descendants surviving.

Published on: April 30, 2015

Petitioner Seeks Clarity on Disposition of Property

by Stephen Bilkis

A New York Probate Lawyer said that in this proceeding the executors seek a determination as to the validity and effect of the disposition of property described in testator’s will and authorization to sell the real property of which testator died seized. Testator’s will dated April 18, 1956 was admitted to probate in this Court on August 7, 1959.

A New York Estate Lawyer said that after providing for the payment of administration expenses, testator in paragraphs ‘Second’ and ‘Third’ of his will devised a parcel of real property to his brother, H, and another parcel to his son-in-law, ‘absolutely’. In paragraphs ‘Fourth’ to ‘Tenth’ inclusive, testator bequeathed general legacies to two nieces and five churches. Paragraph ‘Eleventh’, which is the residuary clause, disposed of the remainder of testator’s estate, both real and personal, as follows: (a) sixty percent (60%) to his said brother, H, and (b) forth percent (40%) to his son-in-law, O (one of the petitioner herein); and in paragraph ‘Twelfth’ directed that in the event his brother H predeceased him, then ‘one-half of his remaining share be distributed amongst the above enumerated five Churches equally, and the balance to be given to my son-in-law, O.’

A Manhattan Probate Lawyer said that under paragraph ‘Thirteenth’ testator provided that all payments be made from ‘cash assets’ at the time of his death and in the event the cash was not sufficient, then ‘distribution of these cash bequests be made on a proportionate basis.’ The will in paragraph ‘Fourteenth’ further provided that the executors are ‘not to attempt to dispose of any of my realty until two (2) years after my death’ and thereafter the executors were to exercise ‘their discretion’ to sell or otherwise dispose of the real property. Testator also provided in paragraph ‘Fourteenth’ of the will that ‘If, further, there is not sufficient sums to make the payments as mentioned in paragraph ‘Twelfth’, then I direct that as soon as any sales of realty are made, that first the specific bequests be paid and thereafter distribution be made to my surviving distributees.’ H predeceased the testator leaving no descendants surviving.

Published on: March 31, 2015

petitioner Seeks Interpretation of Tax Clause in Will

by Stephen Bilkis

The executors have requested construction of several provisions of Mrs. VK’s will admitted to probate in 1969.

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Probate Lawyers said the principal problem concerns the meaning of the tax clause. Since the bulk of the estate consists of stock in a family corporation, construction of the tax clause in turn may require a section 303 Internal Revenue Code stock redemption to meet the tax obligation.

Published on: March 30, 2015

Petitioner Alleges Decedent’s Guardian Failed to File Certain Reports

by Stephen Bilkis

A Probate Lawyer said that, in a probate proceeding in which the administrator, in effect, petitioned pursuant to SCPA 1809 to determine the validity of certain claims against the estate of the decedent, also known as the petitioner appeals from (1) an order of the Surrogate’s Court, Kings County, dated April 27, 2009, which, in effect, denied that branch of the petition which was to invalidate the claim of the claimant, and directed that claimant be reimbursed in the sum of $4,474 for payment of the decedent’s funeral expenses, and (2) an order of the same court dated May 13, 2009, which denied her motion to vacate the order dated April 27, 2009.

A Kings Will Contest Lawyer said that in another case is (1) from so much of an order of the Surrogate’s Court, Kings County, entered July 8, 1965, as denied his cross motion for leave to take the further oral deposition of two persons as witnesses pursuant to statute (CPLR 3101, subd. [a], par. 4; 3111); and (2) from an order of said court, entered September 2, 1965, upon re-argument, which adhered to the original decision. Order entered September 2, 1965, affirmed with a separate bill of $10 costs and disbursements to the respondent and to the Special Guardian, each payable out of the estate. No opinion. Appeal from order, entered July 8, 1965, dismissed, without costs. The appeal was untimely taken. Appellant admitted receiving notice of entry of said order on July 13, 1965, yet his notice of appeal therefrom is dated September 9, 1965, clearly beyond the statutory time (CPLR, § 5513, subd. [a]). In any event, said order was superseded by the later order granting re-argument

A New York Estate Lawyer said the Surrogate’s Court properly determined that the claim against the estate by the claimant for reimbursement of the decedent’s funeral expenses, which expenses the petitioner conceded were paid by the claimant, was valid (see SCPA 1809, 1811). Contrary to the petitioner’s contention, the Surrogate’s Court did not err in declining to consider, in the instant proceeding, the petitioner’s allegation that the claimant, who had been appointed the decedent’s guardian pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law article 81 prior to the decedent’s death, had failed to file certain required reports and accountings, and otherwise breached her fiduciary duty as the decedent’s guardian (see Mental Hygiene Law § 81.44[g]; see also SCPA 2103).

Published on: March 29, 2015

Testatrix Intended to Donate Entire Estate to Charity

by Stephen Bilkis

A Probate Lawyer said that, this is an appeal from an order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Second Judicial Department (229 App. Div. 809, 242 N. Y. S. 621), entered May 22, 1930, modifying and affirming as modified a decree of the Kings County Surrogate’s Court admitting to probate the last will and testament of Catherine C. Devine, deceased, so as to provide that costs of the trial be awarded to the contestant, who was named as executor in two other wills, under the provisions of section 278 of the Surrogate’s Court Act.

A Westchester County Probate Lawyer said that, in another case a proceeding was brought to probate and construe will. The fourteenth article of the will gave the residue of the estate of the testatrix to named executrix for any and all charities that she in her uncontrolled discretion might deem it best and fitting. In preceding articles of the will the testatrix made specific bequests to persons and organizations for various religious and charitable purposes. In the fifteenth article she stated that she made no provision in the will for any relative ‘for reasons best known to myself.’ The executrix died on February 26, 1961, and the testatrix died on October 26, 1962.

Suffolk County Probate Lawyers said the Surrogate’s Court, Kings County, construed the fourteenth article and held that will clearly disclosed that sole intention of testatrix was to devote her entire estate to charitable and religious purposes, and that fact that named executrix predeceased testatrix did not affect validity of gifts for benefit of ultimate charitable beneficiaries, and that the discretion reposed in the named executrix was not such an essential part of the testamentary plan that her death would thwart intended charitable purposes of testatrix, and that residuary estate should be equally distributed among beneficiaries designated in other articles of the will.