Articles Posted in Wills

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This is an application for limited letters of temporary estate administration. Decedent executed a will in Ireland which was witnessed by the manager for the United States Lines in Ireland and the American Consul in Cork. Beside a small bequest to a friend, the entire residuary is bequeathed to the decedent’s granddaughter. The will does not name an executor. The decedent’s granddaughter petitions for probate of the will and for letters of administration c. t. a. She makes this motion for limited letters of temporary estate administration so that she can commence an action against the United States Lines before the statute of limitations runs out. This motion is opposed by one of two sisters who are distributees of decedent, on the ground that the wrongful death suit is ‘exclusively for the benefit of the decedent’s wife, husband, parent, child or dependent relative.’ She argues that the decedent’s granddaughter is none of these and that under section 118 of the Surrogate’s Court Act, letters should issue to a distributee, namely, herself, so that she might bring the action against the steamship line.

The applicable federal statute provides that the action shall be maintained by the personal representative of the decedent (Title 46, Sec. 761, U.S.C.A.). Since it appears that the will of decedent is uncontested and that on its probate the decedent’s granddaughter would be entitled to letters of administration c. t. a. as the sole residuary legatee (Surrogate’s Ct. Act, § 133, subd. 2) and would be the person authorized under the federal statute to prosecute the action, the Court will appoint her Temporary Administratrix under Limited Letters, upon qualifying according to law. Upon the will being admitted to probate, the Temporary Letters will be revoked and letters of administration c. t. a. will issue to the decedent’s granddaughter nning. Settle decree on notice.

In another case, a lawyer said that a probate proceeding petitioner claims that under the terms of the propounded instrument she is entitled to decedent’s net estate and to letters testamentary. The respondents have appeared and filed their consent to probate the instrument, but dispute petitioner’s claim. A construction is requested to determine whether the provisions of paragraph ‘Fourth’ are operative and dispose of decedent’s estate.

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This is a probate case where the decedent died on May 1, 2004, leaving a will which was admitted to probate on July 7, 2004. The decedent was survived by his four children. The will makes pre-residuary cash bequests of $45,000.00 to each of the children. The will further provides that the decedent’s residuary estate be divided equally among his four children. Letters testamentary issued to Executor on July 7, 2004.

The son originally filed a First and Final Accounting of his proceedings covering the period May 1, 2004 through January 31, 2008. Thereafter, he filed a document which covers the period from May 1, 2004 to January 31, 2008, the same period covered by the First and Final Accounting. The Interim Account was verified by the son on February 18, 2009, nearly one year after the First and Final Account.

Another son filed objections to the accounting which raised several issues. The parties stipulated at trial that the estate had the burden of proof on the issue of whether the decedent make a loan to the oppositor In addition, the parties acknowledged that administrator son took an advance payment of commissions in the amount of $10,0000.00, without prior court order and repaid the sum of $10,000.00 to the estate.

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In this estate proceeding, an Order and decree, Surrogate’s Court, New York County, entered on or about May 22, 1995, which removed the preliminary coexecutors, and appointed the lawyer and a Trust Company as temporary administrators, affirmed, without costs.

The Surrogate’s removal of the preliminary coexecutors pursuant to SCPA 711 and 719 was a proper exercise of discretion, and no evidentiary hearing was required under the particular circumstances. While the Surrogate’s characterization of the facts as “undisputed” may not have been technically accurate, the unfitness of the coexecutors was established by a combination of documentary proof and the coexecutors’ own concessions, and the totality of written submissions failed to raise any triable issue of fact. We note that the coexecutors were not prejudiced in any manner by the informality of the investigation and report completed by limited temporary administrator, since the Surrogate’s decision expressly disclaimed reliance on the report’s unproven allegations.

The unfitness of the coexecutors to take responsibility for this $1.2 billion estate, bequeathed primarily to charity, was manifest. While “courts will not undertake to make a better will nor name a better executor for the testator, the standard of behavior of a fiduciary is “[n]ot honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive”.

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This is a proceeding to construe the last will and testament of a testatrix who died on April 18, 2010, survived by five children. Her will, dated September 1, 2006 (the “Will”), was admitted to probate on July 2, 2010 and letters testamentary issued to petitioner, one of her children. Article SECOND of the Will established a credit shelter trust for her husband, with remainder to her children. Article THREE left the “rest, residue and remainder” of her estate to her husband outright. Her husband predeceased her and she provided in Article FOURTH that if her husband predeceased her, she left “all the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, real, personal and mixed and wheresoever situated”

The estate is sufficiently large to generate a New York State estate tax. Article FIFTH of the will provides that “All estate, inheritance, transfer, succession or other similar taxes shall be payable out of the residuary of my estate”. The executor asks that the Court construe the gift to real property to the devisee in Article FOURTH(A) as a preresiduary gift and the remainder clause of Article FOURTH(B) as the residuary estate. The executor brings this construction proceeding, since he claims that not all of the residuary beneficiaries agree with his interpretation.

In the Will in question, Article FIFTH directs that the payment of estate taxes be paid from the residuary estate. The problem is that the Will contains two residuary clauses. The first is found in the preamble to Article FOURTH, which disposes of the “all rest, residue and remainder of my estate, real , personal and mixed and wheresoever situated” of the testator’s estate if the testator’s husband predeceased the testator. The second is Article FOURTH(B), which purports to dispose of the “rest and remainder” of the testator’s estate after the devise of real property in Article FOURTH(A).

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In 1970 a group annuity contract plan was entered into by defendant Company and a hospital as contract holder. On April 25, 1972, the company issued its certificate to a doctor, which named him as a participant in that group annuity plan.

The certificate had originally been issued on April 4, 1972, with the same designated beneficiaries, but the name was misspelled. In a handwritten note, a request was made to correct the spelling and as a result, company issued the corrected certificate dated April 25, 1972, referred to supra.

The decedent, who was the first wife and the mother of their two sons, died on August 23, 1973. Approximately one year after her death the doctor remarried. His new wife was the plaintiff in this action. The doctor died in February 1979 and his will, executed March 3, 1976, was admitted to probate in March 1979.

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Motion is made to strike out a counterclaim interposed in this action wherein plaintiff seeks to compel defendants to deliver to her a bank passbook of an account in the Interest Department of the ABC Trust Company of Albany issued to and opened in the name of ‘Ms. B, in Trust for Ms. OD.’

Ms. OD is the plaintiff and Ms. B is now deceased. The defendant Mrs. V is the named executrix in the last will and testament of Ms. B, which has been offered for, but as yet has not been admitted to, probate. The co-defendant Mrs. M, an attorney, drew such will, was a subscribing witness thereto, and is acting as the attorney for Mrs. V in offering it for probate. It is alleged that such defendants have possession of the passbook, without which plaintiff cannot withdraw the fund, and that they have refused to deliver it to her upon demand.

The defendants’ answer admits all of the allegations of the complaint except that plaintiff ‘is entitled to possession of the said bank book’ and it also contains certain matter asserted as ‘a separate defense and by way of counterclaim.’ In that contention defendants allege the opening of the account by Ms. B in form in trust for plaintiff, as well as the making of the will hereinabove referred to. They further allege that objections to the probate of the will have been made by certain persons, to wit, KK, QQ and ET, who would be the intestate distributees of Ms. B, of whom plaintiff is not one; that such objections, among other things, challenge her testamentary capacity; that the funds going into the bank deposit set up for plaintiff derived from a sale of real property of the deceased, and that no part thereof ‘was produced or provided by the said Ms. OD;’ that the bank account was set up approximately two months prior to the execution of the will; that if such objections to it are sustained the validity of the disposition of the aforesaid bank account likewise will be attacked; that the defendants have been presented with adverse claims to the funds represented by such bank account by both plaintiff and such distributees of Ms. B, and that they ‘cannot determine, without hazard to themselves, the right of the said persons to the said property and are exposed to double liability as the result of such adverse claims.’ Defendants assert their willingness to deliver the passbook and the fund it represents to whomsoever shall be adjudged entitled to it. They allege that they have impleaded the distributees who make the adverse claims as aforesaid by service upon them of a summons and interpleading complaint, together with a copy of the original summons and complaint served upon them in this action.’

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In a contested probate proceeding, the Objectant appeal from a decree of the Surrogate’s Court, Kings County and dated March 17, 1993, which, after a nonjury trial, inter alia, granted probate of a certain will signed by the testator on March 17, 1987. Also, the Objectant raises the issue that in case the probate is granted, construction must be made in some of the provision of the will.

After trial on the issue of denial of probate of the will, the court ordered for its denial. The Court explained that, there was no evidence of a meeting of the minds between the testator and the attesting witnesses that the instrument they were being asked to sign as witnesses was testamentary in character see, EPTL 3-2.1[a][3]; see also, Matter of Pulvermacher, 305 N.Y. 378, 383, 113 N.E.2d 525; Matter of Turell, 166 N.Y. 330, 337, 59 N.E. 910).

The courts commonly say that where will construction is at issue, they will first consider the decedent’s intent, which can be derived from reading the will and considering the circumstances from which it was created 11 Warren Heaton’s on Surrogate Court Practice 187.01 [3][a] (7th ed Mathew Bender).

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At issue in this proceeding is the right of the trustees of the estate of the donor of a power of appointment to commissions for paying out the appointive property to trustees appointed under the will of the donee of such power.

Testator Mr. S died in 1952. His will admitted to probate in this Court created out of his residuary estate a marital deduction trust for his wife Mrs. S–one coupled with a general testamentary power of appointment. For later discussion, it is observed that under such a power Mrs. S could appoint to her estate or to her creditors or to creditors of her estate or to any other person she may wish. Under the express terms of the will she could also appoint outright or in further trust.

Mrs. S died on June 11, 1969, a resident of Connecticut. Her will has been admitted to probate in the Connecticut courts. By her will she expressly exercised her power of appointment. She first directed her own trustees to pay out of the appointive property all estate taxes on both the appointive property and her own estate assets. She then directed her Own trustees to divide the remaining principal of the appointive property into four shares, each such share to be held in further trust for her four grandchildren with remainder over to her great grandchildren. There are ten such great grandchildren remaindermen represented in this proceeding by a guardian ad litem. Mrs. S appointed as her own trustees the same persons who were already acting as trustees under Mr. S’s will.

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Surrogate Court, Queens City, NY

February 2, 2016

Decedent passed away on August 29, 2002, and is survived by 4 children. Her 2 daughters are the petitioners, and one of her sons is the objectant. The other son is the executor of the estate.

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In this probate proceeding, respondents Mr. AX and Mrs. AXW move to compel the co-executors of the estate, Mrs. JA, the surviving spouse of decedent, and Mr. K, accountant of decedent, to reproduce: (1) the original and/or photocopies of prior wills of the decedent; (2) un-redacted photocopies of two letters between decedent and the attorney/draftsman, Mr. JM, Esq., and; (3) un-redacted photocopies of notes taken by Mr. JM during two separate in-person meetings with the decedent. For the reasons set forth below, an in camera review of said materials, in un-redacted form, is necessary.

In opposition to respondents’ motion, the executors allege they are unable to locate any prior wills and will provide such in the event that they are located. In response to the redactions, the executors contend that Mr. JM represented both decedent and decedent’s surviving spouse, Mrs. JA, in connection with their estate plan, and had confidential communications with decedent and Mrs. JA, jointly and individually, concerning Mrs. JA’s estate plan and assets, and that the contents of those communications concerning Mrs. JA’s estate plan and assets are the subject of the redacted material and are, therefore, privileged, pursuant to the attorney-client privilege afforded by CPLR 4503, and not discoverable by third parties.

In actions involving the probate, validity or construction of a will, an attorney or his employee is required to disclose information as to the preparation, execution or revocation of any will or other relevant instrument, but he shall not be allowed to disclose any communication privileged under subdivision (a) which would tend to disgrace the memory of the decedent. Respondents contend in their motion that these documents are not privileged as they contain information pertaining to the decedent and his will that the executors are required to disclose.

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