Articles Posted in Wills

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The petitioner seeks a final judicial settlement of its accounts as Executor under the last Will and Testament of the deceased. As a part of the judicial settlement, petitioner requests this Surrogate’s Court to direct by appropriate order that future payments of support to decedent’s surviving first wife be made an obligation of the Trustee of decedent’s residuary estate and payable from the income and, if necessary, the principal of that residuary trust.

It appears without dispute that by an agreement dated October 10, 1952, decedent assumed an obligation to pay the sum of $300 a month to his first wife, for her support. It was provided that such monthly payments were to continue for the lifetime of the first wife. The Executor properly concluded that the obligation for payment survived the decedent and was binding upon the estate. The agreement is valid and enforceable. The accounts of the Executor disclose that the required payments have been considered as periodically accruing debts and have been paid monthly by the Executor throughout the administration of the estate.

The issue in this case is whether the final judicial settlement of the executor’s accounts should be granted.

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The two cases hereunder is about probate proceedings.

In the first case involves a contested probate proceeding, the Court determines that the propounded instrument was not executed as required by Decedent Estate Law, § 21. This statute requires by subdivision 2 thereof, that decedent’s subscription of the instrument shall be made in the presence of each of the attesting witnesses or shall be acknowledged by him to have been so made to each of such witnesses. By subdivision 3 thereof, the statute requires the decedent to declare that the instrument subscribed by him was his last will and testament. Compliance with only one of these requirements may not be urged to constitute compliance with the other. Since decedent did not subscribe her name in the presence of the witness, Glackman, it was necessary that she acknowledge such signature to this witness. This she did not do. The fact that decedent may have declared the instrument to be her will, as required by subdivision 3, does not serve as a compliance with subdivision 2. In re Banta’s Will, 204 Misc. 985, 128 N.Y.S.2d 334. This is especially so where, as here, the appended signature is in a foreign language which the witness cannot read (1 Davids on New York Law of Wills, § 301).

The Court finds that decedent did not subscribe the instrument in the presence of the two attesting witnesses and did not acknowledge such subscription to be her signature to said witnesses as required by the statute.

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The two cases hereunder is about probate proceedings.In the first case involves a contested probate proceeding, the Court determines that the propounded instrument was not executed as required by Decedent Estate Law, § 21. This statute requires by subdivision 2 thereof, that decedent’s subscription of the instrument shall be made in the presence of each of the attesting witnesses or shall be acknowledged by him to have been so made to each of such witnesses. By subdivision 3 thereof, the statute requires the decedent to declare that the instrument subscribed by him was his last will and testament. Compliance with only one of these requirements may not be urged to constitute compliance with the other. Since decedent did not subscribe her name in the presence of the witness, Glackman, it was necessary that she acknowledge such signature to this witness. This she did not do. The fact that decedent may have declared the instrument to be her will, as required by subdivision 3, does not serve as a compliance with subdivision 2. In re Banta’s Will, 204 Misc. 985, 128 N.Y.S.2d 334. This is especially so where, as here, the appended signature is in a foreign language which the witness cannot read (1 Davids on New York Law of Wills, § 301).

In the first case involves a contested probate proceeding, the Court determines that the propounded instrument was not executed as required by Decedent Estate Law, § 21. This statute requires by subdivision 2 thereof, that decedent’s subscription of the instrument shall be made in the presence of each of the attesting witnesses or shall be acknowledged by him to have been so made to each of such witnesses. By subdivision 3 thereof, the statute requires the decedent to declare that the instrument subscribed by him was his last will and testament. Compliance with only one of these requirements may not be urged to constitute compliance with the other. Since decedent did not subscribe her name in the presence of the witness, Glackman, it was necessary that she acknowledge such signature to this witness. This she did not do. The fact that decedent may have declared the instrument to be her will, as required by subdivision 3, does not serve as a compliance with subdivision 2. In re Banta’s Will, 204 Misc. 985, 128 N.Y.S.2d 334. This is especially so where, as here, the appended signature is in a foreign language which the witness cannot read (1 Davids on New York Law of Wills, § 301).

The Court finds that decedent did not subscribe the instrument in the presence of the two attesting witnesses and did not acknowledge such subscription to be her signature to said witnesses as required by the statute.

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In this miscellaneous proceeding, the petitioner, Catholic Child Care Society of the Diocese of Brooklyn (hereinafter Catholic Child Care Society) seeks to modify the decedent’s will to designate St. John’s Residence for Boys as a beneficiary of a testamentary trust (hereinafter Dowdall Testamentary Trust) established under the decedent’s will in lieu of Catholic Child Care Society pursuant to EPTL 8-1.1.

The decedent E.M. Dowdall died on April 13, 1968. Her will was admitted to probate in this court on January 16, 1969. Article Fourth of the will sets forth various charitable beneficiaries which include The Carmelite Sisters of the Aged and Infirmed, The Catholic Foreign Missionary Society of America (Maryknoll Fathers), The Nursing Sisters of the Sick Poor, The Monastery of Our Lady of Mt. Carmel, and The Confraternity of the Precious Blood. Each of these organizations receives a specific bequest of $5,000.

Article Fifth of the will for which relief under EPTL 8-1.1 is sought bequeaths the entire residuary estate to a trust for the benefit of Catholic Child Care Society. Article Fifth further provides for the invasion of the principal of the trust annually until the trust and corpus is exhausted. The Dowdall Testamentary Trust has a remaining principal of approximately $90,000.

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In a probate proceeding in which HW, a/k/a JW, petitioned pursuant to SCPA 1421, inter alia, to determine the validity and effect of an election pursuant to EPTL 5-1.1-A asserted by her against the estate of the decedent IB, the co-executors of the decedent’s estate, JB and HB, appeal, as limited by their brief, from (1) so much of an order of the Surrogate’s Court, Kings County dated July 3, 2008, as granted the petitioner’s motion for summary judgment on the petition and directed dismissal of their counterclaims, without prejudice, and (2) so much of a decree of the same court dated August 5, 2008, as, upon the order, in effect, is in favor of the petitioner and against them granting the petition, declaring that the election was valid, and dismissing their counterclaims, without prejudice, and the petitioner cross-appeals from (1) so much of the order as, upon directing the dismissal of the counterclaims asserted by JB and HB, did so without prejudice, and (2) so much of the decree, as, upon the order, and upon dismissing the counterclaims, did so without prejudice.

The appeal from the intermediate order must be dismissed because the right of direct appeal therefrom terminated with the entry of the decree. The issues raised on the appeal from the order are brought up for review and have been considered on the appeal from the decree.

In 1982 IB (hereinafter the decedent), an extremely successful businessman who founded the Berk Trade and Business School (hereinafter the School), executed a will. In his will, the decedent named his two sons, JB and HB, as the co-executors of his estate.

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The two subscribing witnesses testified to the due execution of decedent’s holographic will and to her testamentary capacity at the time of the execution; that the last page of the instrument, the only one they saw, bore no additional writings below their signatures.

The changes in the street numbers of the addresses of the legatees under items 13 and 14 are immaterial, as well as the interlineation of the amount of the legacy of item 13, as the amount thereof was increased by figures immediately above it and that in turn was interlined and the original amount reinstated with the initials of the decedent above it; the amount of item 16 was interlined, and a lesser sum substituted therefor immediately above it, which in turn was likewise interlined and the original amount restored. Equally immaterial is the phrase in item 15 which reads in payment of money ($500) she gave my sister Mae and for which I thank her. Those interlineations and additions being fair upon their face and unexplained by any evidence to the contrary must be presumed to have been made before the execution of the will. Crossman v. Crossman, 95 N.Y. 145, 153.

The Court finds that the following legacies were originally written in the following sums: item 6–$1,000; item 17–$100; item 18–$100; item 19-$50; and item 20-$200, which sums were interlined and other sums substituted in their places; the interlineations were made either in pencil or ink and the substituted sums in ink, which ink interlineations and substitutions are in different color ink than the original legacies, wherefore it is found that such interlineations and substitutions of different sums were made subsequent to the execution of the will. Matter of Ross’ Will, 177 App.Div. 719, 164 N.Y.S. 884.

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The contestant has made application to the Court for an order vacating and setting aside the proponent’s demand for a bill of particulars, or in the alternative, modifying said demand, and for such other, further and different relief as to the Court may seem necessary and proper. The proponent’s demand for a bill of particulars is directed to the allegations of fraud and undue influence in paragraph 3 of the contestant’s objections.

The application will be treated as though the proponent were seeking a bill by motion in the first instance, since it calls upon the Court to determine the nature and extent of the items, if any, which the contestant should furnish to the proponent.

It is too well settled to require citation of authority, that the proponent in a contested probate may properly require the particularization of the charges of fraud and undue influence asserted to defeat the probate.

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The decedent ALF, died on the 9th day of January, 1961, while a patient at the Wolcott Clinic, Wolcott, New York.

On the 21st day of February, 1961, EGF, the son of the decedent, presented to this Court a petition praying that an instrument in writing dated February 5, 1955, and executed by the decedent purporting to be her Last Will and Testament, be admitted to probate by this Court, which petition alleged, that the said decedent at the time of her death was a resident of the Village of Red Creek, Wayne County, New York.

Thereafter and on the 11th day of July, 1961, the respondent, EKM, a niece of the decedent, a legatee under the instrument above recited, presented to this Court a petition putting in issue the domicile of the decedent ALF at the time of her death and requesting a Hearing by the Court to determine the question above stated. A Hearing was held on the 17th day of July, 1961, and both the proponent therein represented by JCS, Attorney, Wolcott, New York, and the respondent therein represented by RFZ, Attorney, Sodus, New York, produced witnesses and gave testimony to this Court relative to the above issue.

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Before the court is the motion of PLK, the nominated successor co-trustee of the trusts created under Paragraphs Second, Third and Sixth of the will of WM. Movant seeks summary judgment pursuant to CPLR 3213 granting his petition for appointment as successor co-trustee pursuant to SCPA 1502. In the alternative, movant asks the court to issue an order pursuant to CPLR 3126 striking the objections to his appointment which were filed by SM, a trust beneficiary, for her failure to provide discovery.

WM died on February 14, 2008, survived by his wife, SM (hereinafter, the objectant), his son, MM, and his daughter, LM. Decedent left a will dated October 27, 2004, as amended by codicil dated October 12, 2006. The will and codicil were admitted to probate by this court on April 4, 2008. In Paragraph Second of the will, decedent established a credit shelter trust for the benefit of the objectant. In Paragraph Third of the will, decedent established a generation-skipping trust for the benefit of the objectant. In Paragraph Sixth of the will, decedent created a residuary trust for the benefit of the objectant. In connection with each of the three trusts, letters of trusteeship were issued by this court on April 4, 2008, to the three nominated trustees, namely, MCA, CAL, and the objectant.

MCA submitted his written resignation as trustee on February 2, 2010. The nominated successor trustee, SL, executed a renunciation on February 11, 2010. On May 13, 2010, MCA filed a petition with this court for permission to resign and for the appointment of PLK (hereinafter, movant), the next successor trustee nominated by the decedent in his will.

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This case involves the enforcement of a sister-state divorce judgment, with respect to arrears in alimony and support payments, pursuant to the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (article 54 of the CPLR).

In January 1973, the plaintiff-wife commenced an action for divorce in the Superior Court of the State of Connecticut where she was then living and has continued to reside with her two minor children. While the action was pending, the parties executed a separation agreement on April 16, 1973. The agreement provided, Inter alia, for semimonthly payments to the plaintiff for alimony and child support. Thereafter on August 16, 1973, the plaintiff was granted a judgment of absolute divorce by the Connecticut court, specifically incorporating the terms of the separation agreement, the agreement surviving and not merging into the decree.

From the papers it appears that the defendant resided in Manhattan when the separation agreement was executed, and in Brooklyn when the divorce judgment was granted. There is no question of the defendant appearing in and being represented by counsel in the divorce action. Defendant currently lives in Brooklyn and is a practicing veterinarian. Plaintiff alleges that she is a housewife with part-time employment as a teacher in Stamford, Connecticut where her gross annual pay is $3,000.

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