Wills

Published on: December 9, 2015

Court Discusses Complicated Summary Judgment Proceeding

by Stephen Bilkis

This is a motion in a pending probate proceeding for summary judgment and to strike out objections filed by assignees of a beneficiary under a power of appointment. The father of decedent died on April 7, 1901, a resident of the county of New York. His will was duly admitted to in the Surrogate’s Court of New York County on April 22, 1901, when letters testamentary probate was issued. The estate and trusts created under said will are administered in that county. The decedent in this proceeding had a power of appointment of the remainder of a trust created for her benefit under the will of her father. In 1942 decedent’s son assigned his interests in said trust under the will of the decedent to several assignees. The propounded instrument which is the subject of this proceeding nominates the decedent’s son, and his wife as executors. By her will decedent appointed one-third of the appointive property to her son, and two-thirds to a granddaughter. Citations were issued in this estate to the assignees of said son who do not oppose the probate of the will but object to the granting of letters herein to their assignor and his wife, the nominated executors.

In another case, an appeal from an order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Second Judicial Department (241 App. Div. 768, 270 N. Y. S. 981), entered March 30, 1934, which affirmed a decree of the Kings County Surrogate’s Court admitting to probate an instrument, dated October 30, 1930, propounded as the last will and testament of the deceased, and a codicil thereto dated June 9, 1931.

Objections were filed to the probate of these instruments on the ground that they were not the last will and codicil of the deceased; that they were not duly executed; that at the time they were executed the deceased lacked testamentary capacity; and that their execution was obtained by undue influence, fraud, and conspiracy. Following a trial before a jury and after the contestants had rested, the surrogate, over the objection and exception of contestants, directed a verdict admitting the instruments in question to probate.

Published on: November 23, 2015

Petitioner, a Charity, Seeks to Modify Decedent’s Will

by Stephen Bilkis

In this miscellaneous proceeding, the petitioner, Catholic Child Care Society of the Diocese of Brooklyn (hereinafter Catholic Child Care Society) seeks to modify the decedent’s will to designate St. John’s Residence for Boys as a beneficiary of a testamentary trust (hereinafter Dowdall Testamentary Trust) established under the decedent’s will in lieu of Catholic Child Care Society pursuant to EPTL 8-1.1.

The decedent E.M. Dowdall died on April 13, 1968. Her will was admitted to probate in this court on January 16, 1969. Article Fourth of the will sets forth various charitable beneficiaries which include The Carmelite Sisters of the Aged and Infirmed, The Catholic Foreign Missionary Society of America (Maryknoll Fathers), The Nursing Sisters of the Sick Poor, The Monastery of Our Lady of Mt. Carmel, and The Confraternity of the Precious Blood. Each of these organizations receives a specific bequest of $5,000.

Article Fifth of the will for which relief under EPTL 8-1.1 is sought bequeaths the entire residuary estate to a trust for the benefit of Catholic Child Care Society. Article Fifth further provides for the invasion of the principal of the trust annually until the trust and corpus is exhausted. The Dowdall Testamentary Trust has a remaining principal of approximately $90,000.

Published on: November 21, 2015

Defendant Files Objections to Probate Accounting

by Stephen Bilkis

The decedent died in May 2004, leaving a will which was admitted to probate. The decedent was survived by his four children. The will makes pre-residuary cash bequests of $45,000.00 to each of the children. The will further provides that the decedent’s residuary estate be divided equally among his four children. Letters testamentary issued to petitioner in July 2004.

The Petitioner originally filed a First and Final Accounting of his proceedings covering the period May 2004 through January 2008. Thereafter, he filed a First Interim Account of the Estate of the decedent. This document covers the period from May 2004 to January 2008, the same period covered by the First and Final Accounting. The Interim Account was verified by Petitioner in February 2009, nearly one year after the First and Final Account.

The brother filed objections to the accounting. The parties stipulated at trial that the estate had the burden of proof on the issue of whether the decedent made a loan to the brother. In addition, the parties acknowledged that petitioner took an advance payment of commissions in the amount of $10,0000.00, without prior court order and repaid the sum of $10,000.00 to the estate.

Published on: November 19, 2015

Plaintiff Appeals Decision Denying Request for Constructive Trust

by Stephen Bilkis

In this action for a declaratory judgment, plaintiffs appeal from a judgment where, following a trial on stipulated facts, the court dismissed the complaint. Plaintiffs are the only children of the husband and wife, both now deceased. The wife died first and the husband thereafter. Defendant is the second wife and the other defendant is the executor of the last will and testament of said husband.

Upon the death of the husband, plaintiffs commenced the within action seeking a declaration of their rights with respect to the husband’s estate. The complaint consisted of four causes of action, as follows: (1) To impress a constructive trust upon certain real property located at 141 Forest Green, Staten Island; (2) To void the right of election filed by defendant second wife under section 5-1.1 of the Estates, Powers and Trusts Law as surviving widow of the husband; (3) To impress a constructive trust upon the proceeds of a pension plan of the deceased husband had with the City of New York, which were paid to Anne as designated beneficiary at the husband’s death.; (4) To impress a constructive trust upon funds which prior to the death of the first wife had been in savings and/or checking accounts in the joint or individual names of the husband and wife, and upon other personal property which had been in the joint and/or individual names of the husband and wife prior to the wife’s death, which the husband thereafter transferred to himself and the second wife as joint tenants.

On October 17, 1967 the husband and wife had executed a joint will which provides, in pertinent part, as follows: We, in consideration of the agreement of each of us to dispose of our property as hereinafter set forth, do hereby make, publish and declare this to be our joint Last Will and Testament. First: We give to the survivor of us all our property, both real and personal. Second: After the death of the survivor of either of us, all our property, both real and personal, we give devise and bequeath unto our children (plaintiffs herein). The wife died on September 27, 1971 and the joint will, insofar as her estate was concerned, was admitted to probate in Kings County. At the time of her death, the husband and wife owned as tenants by the entirety, two parcels of real estate, one at 3722 Clarendon Road and the other at Avenue D, in Kings County, and had a bank account in their joint names in a Brooklyn bank.

Published on: November 16, 2015

Widow Refuses to Submit Will to Probate

by Stephen Bilkis

In a probate proceeding, the decedent’s widow, appeals from stated portions of a decree of the Surrogate’s Court, Kings County, dated February 13, 1991, which, inter alia, upon refusing to admit a will to probate, impressed a constructive trust upon the entire estate for the benefit of the beneficiaries named in the will, and directed disposition of the decedent’s estate.

The decedent and his wife, the appellant, executed mutual wills that were mirror images of each other. The couple was childless and wanted their assets to be shared equally by their respective relatives. Accordingly, simultaneous with the execution of the wills, they executed a written contract which prohibited either party from revoking or changing the wills in any way, without the written consent of the other, and they further provided that any attempt to do so would be ineffective as against the claims of the legatees of the mirror wills. The wife survived the decedent, whose will is the subject matter of this appeal. His will provide a portion of his estate would be placed in trust with the income therefrom to the appellant for life, and the remainder to their relatives, who were enumerated in the will. The decedent bequeathed the rest of his estate to the appellant outright.

After the decedent’s death, the appellant wife, alleging that she could not find the decedent’s will, applied for and obtained letters of administration. As the sole distributee, she received the entire net estate. The petitioner (hereinafter the proponent), a co-executor and co-trustee under the will, commenced the instant proceeding against her to revoke the letters of administration that were issued to her, and to admit to probate a conformed copy of the decedent’s will or, alternatively, for specific performance of the aforementioned agreement.

Published on: November 5, 2015

Petitioner Brings Case Over Lost Will

by Stephen Bilkis

The two case hereunder is about probate proceedings.

The first case is the proceeding to establish a lost will pursuant to Surrogate’s Court Act, § 143. The testimony of the two subscribing witnesses establishes that decedent executed a will on or about February 27, 1948, in full compliance with the provisions of Decedent Estate Law, § 21 and that at that time he was of sound mind and under no restraint.

The attorney-draftsman, who was also one of the subscribing witnesses, testified that the will was turned over to decedent’s son for safekeeping immediately upon its execution. He further testified that he made an exact carbon copy of the original will which he conformed and kept in his files. The said carbon counterpart has been offered for probate by petitioner as decedent’s will.

Published on: November 3, 2015

Court Decides if Heir Left Out of Will was Intentional

by Stephen Bilkis

In this probate proceeding, two non-marital children have moved to have their status as children entitled to benefits under the after-born statute (EPTL 5-3.2) determined. In a prior decision (Dec. No. 80, Feb. 7, 2008), the court ruled that any question regarding a party’s status in a probate proceeding should be determined as a preliminary matter and stayed all other proceedings. Rather than question any of the underlying facts, such as proof of paternity, the parties have consented to have the motion submitted assuming the truth of the movant’s allegations for a determination of whether as a matter of law those allegations state a cause of action entitling the claimants to after-born status.

The decedent died on January 13, 2007, survived by eleven children; three from a first marriage, four from a second marriage and four alleged non-marital children. The will offered for probate benefits only one child from the first marriage, the petitioner and named executrix, who inherits the entire estate valued at several million dollars.

EPTL 5-3.2 creates a rule of presumed intent for a testator who may have inadvertently omitted a child born after he executed his will. If he gave something to existing children and the after-born is neither provided for nor mentioned in the will and unprovoked for by some settlement, the after-born shares in the gift to existing children. Case law has granted non-marital after-born children the same rights as marital after-born children if they can establish their inheritance rights under EPTL 4-1.2. Since the Wilkins case was decided, the after-born statute has been amended to address the rights of after-born non-marital children (L. 2007 ch. 423, eff. Aug 1, 2007). The amendment provides: “For purposes of this section, a non-marital child, born after the execution of a last will shall be considered an after-born child of his or her father where paternity is established pursuant to section 4-1.2 of this chapter.”

Published on: November 2, 2015

Petitioner Seeks a Final Judicial Settlements of Accounts

by Stephen Bilkis

The petitioner seeks a final judicial settlement of its accounts as Executor under the last Will and Testament of the deceased. As a part of the judicial settlement, petitioner requests this Surrogate’s Court to direct by appropriate order that future payments of support to decedent’s surviving first wife be made an obligation of the Trustee of decedent’s residuary estate and payable from the income and, if necessary, the principal of that residuary trust.

It appears without dispute that by an agreement dated October 10, 1952, decedent assumed an obligation to pay the sum of $300 a month to his first wife, for her support. It was provided that such monthly payments were to continue for the lifetime of the first wife. The Executor properly concluded that the obligation for payment survived the decedent and was binding upon the estate. The agreement is valid and enforceable. The accounts of the Executor disclose that the required payments have been considered as periodically accruing debts and have been paid monthly by the Executor throughout the administration of the estate.

The issue in this case is whether the final judicial settlement of the executor’s accounts should be granted.

Published on: October 12, 2015

Petitioner Brings Action for Proceeding to Establish Lost Will

by Stephen Bilkis

The two case hereunder is about probate proceedings.

The first case is the proceeding to establish a lost will pursuant to Surrogate’s Court Act, § 143. The testimony of the two subscribing witnesses establishes that decedent executed a will on or about February 27, 1948, in full compliance with the provisions of Decedent Estate Law, § 21 and that at that time he was of sound mind and under no restraint.

The attorney-draftsman, who was also one of the subscribing witnesses, testified that the will was turned over to decedent’s son for safekeeping immediately upon its execution. He further testified that he made an exact carbon copy of the original will which he conformed and kept in his files. The said carbon counterpart has been offered for probate by petitioner as decedent’s will.

Published on: October 11, 2015

Court Discusses Will Construction Issue

by Stephen Bilkis

The proceeding before the court is one for construction of paragraph “THIRD” of the will of the decedent. It has a long and checkered history before the court. The facts, not complex in themselves, but made so because of the number of parties and their constantly altering positions, unfortunately, requires review in detail to do justice to all. The legal issues presented are unusual and present questions of procedure as well as substance, not typically found in probate proceedings. Under paragraph THIRD of his will, the testator bequeathed his residuary estate, valued upon the accounting at $50,393.65, to “The Franciscan Fathers, Christ the King Seminary, St. Bonaventure University, Olean, New York, with the request that High Masses be said for the repose of my Soul and the repose of the Soul of my said wife. The question of the identity of the residuary legatee or legatees first arose on proceedings for judicial settlement.

On October 18, 1976, court was convened on the construction proceeding pursuant to order for the purpose of taking such proof and making such decree as justice requires pursuant to provisions of Sec. 1420, Subd. (1) of SCPA. The attorney for the executrix was called as a witness. His testimony, given without objection, was as follows: He was the scrivener of the will; he had known the testator and his wife for several years and had been their attorney on prior occasions; he had drawn the will of the testator’s wife as well as the testator; the testator’s wife for several years had been an employee of one of the Franciscan Friars at St. Bonaventure University; illness had compelled her to cease her employment immediately before the wills were prepared; under her will, the wife provided for a legacy to the Friars at St. Bonaventure University; the testator and his wife were very close; the provisions for the bequest of the residuary estate of the testator’s will had been influenced by his wife’s position.

The attorney-scrivener testified that he knew the intention of the testator from his conversations with him. He swore on at least three occasions that he had been given specific direction that the residuary legacy was to be given to the “Franciscan Friars at St. Bonaventure, N.Y.”. The emphasis of the direction of the testator was to geography and to location. As to the phrasing employed in identifying the legatee, the attorney-scrivener testified: “If there is any inadvertence in the third paragraph or confusion as to its interpretation, its simply the manner in which I worded the phrase”. The attorney-scrivener testified that he had not known that there was a separate Friary that operated in connection with the Seminary and was of the opinion that the testator did not know that fact either, although the matter had not been specifically discussed.