Two cases were brought before the court for resolution.
In the first case:
On 24 July 2006, the Supreme Court of New York County rendered judgment granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment only to the extent of precluding plaintiff from asserting any claims for legal fees incurred in the prosecution of the action, and denied the defendant’s application to dismiss plaintiff’s claims for consequential damages based on the alleged breach of duty. The defendant appealed.
The order of the Appellate Term of the Supreme Court which reversed a judgment of the New York County Civil Court in tenant’s favor was unanimously reversed, on the law and the facts, without costs, and the landlord’s petition is dismissed.
A New York Probate Lawyer said the evidence presented to the trial court amply supported its conclusion that the respondent’s relationship with the now deceased tenant of record was that of a nontraditional family member, as defined in Rent Stabilization Code wherein any other person residing with the tenant or permanent tenant in the housing accommodation as a primary or principal residence, respectively, who can prove emotional and financial commitment, and interdependence between such person and the tenant or permanent tenant. Although no single factor shall be solely determinative, evidence which is to be considered in determining whether such emotional and financial commitment and interdependence existed may include, without limitation, such factors as longevity of the relationship or sharing of or relying upon each other for payment of household or family expenses, and/or other common necessities of life. Another factor is intermingling of finances as evidenced by, among other things, joint ownership of bank accounts, personal and real property, credit cards, loan obligations, sharing a household budget for purposes of receiving government benefits. Engaging in family-type activities by jointly attending family functions, holidays and celebrations, social and recreational activities are yet another factor to be considered. Another factor is formalizing of legal obligations, intentions, and responsibilities to each other by such means as executing wills naming each other as executor and/or beneficiary, granting each other a power of attorney and/or conferring upon each other authority to make health care decisions each for the other, entering into a personal relationship contract, making a domestic partnership declaration, or serving as a representative payee for purposes of public benefits.
A Queens Probate Lawyer said the court will also consider when the person residing with the tenant is holding themselves out as family members to other family members, friends, members of the community or religious institutions, or society in general, through their words or actions or if the person is regularly performing family functions, such as caring for each other or each other’s extended family members, and/or relying upon each other for daily family services; or if the person residing with the tenant is engaging in any other pattern of behavior, agreement, or other action which evidences the intention of creating a long-term, emotionally committed relationship. In no event would evidence of a sexual relationship between such persons be required or considered.
Two probate proceedings were brought before the court for resolution.
A New York Probate Lawyer said in the first case, the Court was required to determine the manner in which payment of the residuary bequest shall be made. As provided for under the will’s eleventh article, the residuary estate was bequeathed to a resident of Poland to be hers absolutely and forever. A provision followed to the effect that she would go to New York City to receive payment.
Here, the language requiring that the payment be made in New York City must be construed as a precatory provision in no manner affecting the absolute nature of the bequest made. As per written request, the executor may make payment of the said legacy by the appropriate transfer of the funds to the said legatee after 10 July 1962 when she shall have attained her majority, in the manner set forth by the Court in the case entitled Matter of Tybus’ Will.
In a probate proceeding, the petitioner woman appeals from an order of the Surrogate’s Court dated October 16, 2007, as, after a hearing, granted those branches of the motion of the opponent man, which were to disqualify the petitioner from serving as executor for the estate of a woman and to reinstate letters of administration previously issued to the opponent man.
A New York Probate Lawyer said the court ordered that the order is reversed with costs, that branch of the motion of the opponent man, which was to disqualify the petitioner woman is granted only to the extent of requiring the petitioner to retain new counsel for the estate and that branch of the motion is otherwise denied, that branch of the motion which was to reinstate letters of administration previously issued to the opponent man is denied, and the matter is remitted to the Surrogate’s Court for further proceedings.
The right of a testator or the person who made the will to designate, among those legally qualified, who will settle his or her affairs, is not to be lightly discarded. However, the Surrogate Court may disqualify an individual from receiving letters of administration where friction or hostility between such individual and a beneficiary or a co-administrator or co-administratrix, especially where such individual is at fault, interferes with the proper estate administration, and future cooperation is unlikely.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Whelan, J.), entered September 2, 2009, which, upon a jury verdict, and upon the granting of the motion of the defendant Swiss Ranch Estates, Ltd., in effect, pursuant to CPLR 4401, made at the close of the evidence, for judgment as a matter of law on the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 240(1), upon the denial, in effect, of his motion pursuant to CPLR 4401, made at the close of the evidence, for judgment as a matter of law on that cause of action, and upon the denial of his motion pursuant to CPLR 4404(a) to set aside the jury verdict and for judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, to set aside the jury verdict as contrary to the weight of the evidence, is in favor of the defendant Swiss Ranch Estate, Ltd., dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against that defendant.
A New York Probate Lawyer said the plaintiff, who was preparing to install insulation at a home being constructed on property owned by the defendant, Swiss Ranch Estate, Ltd. (hereinafter Swiss Ranch), fell and was injured when a set of stairs connecting the first floor of the home to the garage collapsed beneath him as he stepped onto it.
A Suffolk Estate Litigation lawyer said that, the plaintiff commenced the instant action alleging, inter alia, violations of Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6). At trial, the Supreme Court granted Swiss Ranch’s motion, in effect, pursuant to CPLR 4401, made at the close of the evidence, for judgment as a matter of law on the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 240(1), and denied, in effect, the plaintiff’s motion pursuant to CPLR 4401, made at the close of the evidence, for judgment as a matter of law on that cause of action. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Swiss Ranch on the remaining cause of action, which alleged a violation of Labor Law § 241(6). The plaintiff moved to set aside the verdict and the Supreme Court denied his motion. A judgment was entered in favor of Swiss Ranch and against the plaintiff, dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it. The plaintiff appealed.
The Facts of the Case:
On 18 October 2007, a decedent died and is survived by his daughter-one and his granddaughters, A and B, the children of predeceased daughter-two, as his sole distributes. The decedent’s wife had predeceased him in September 2003. After the death of the decedent, the petitioner instituted an SCPA 2103 discovery proceeding. The petitioner is granddaughter B, who resides in Florida and to whom limited letters of administration (for estate administration purposes in an estate litigation) issued for the sole purpose of prosecuting the discovery proceeding and the respondent is daughter-one, who resides in Selden, Suffolk County. The property, subject of the proceeding, is a parcel of real property in Massapequa Park, Nassau County, and three bank accounts. Apparently, the real property was conveyed by the decedent to the respondent by deed dated 26 August 2004 and recorded 7 September 2004. The deed purported to convey all of the decedent’s right, title and interest in the property, except that it reserved a life estate in the decedent. At the time of decedent’s death, the bank accounts were held either jointly between decedent and respondent or solely by respondent.
In the SCPA 2103 proceeding, petitioner alleges that respondent was in a confidential relationship with the decedent and used that relationship to exert undue influence upon the decedent to convey the real property and change the title and/or beneficiary designations on the subject accounts. In opposition, respondent denies petitioner’s allegations and contends that all the transactions reflect the exercise of the decedent’s own free will. A New York Probate Lawyer said the respondent now moves for a summary judgment and for an order dismissing the petition and canceling a notice of pendency filed against the decedent’s former residence.
The Facts of the Case:
On 2 October 2005, a resident of Sands Point died with a will dated 6 June 1996. He is survived by his wife, his children, A, B and C, and his granddaughter, X, the infant daughter of a predeceased son, D. On 21 September 2006, the will was submitted for probate (will contest proceeding) and letters testamentary issued to the decedent’s wife, the decedent’s daughter, A, and the decedent’s brother. On 23 April 2008, A and the decedent’s brother filed their account, which was subsequently amended and supplemented. Thereafter, a guardian ad litem was appointed by the court to represent the interests of X. The administration and the account reflect ongoing discord between the wife and the decedent’s other fiduciaries, A and the brother, dominated by conflict over the computation of the wife’s elective share. Ultimately, the parties executed a stipulation, receipt, release and refunding agreement which resolves all of the disputed issues other than the legal fee paid from estate assets to an attorney, who provided legal services to A and the brother at the onset of the administration but whom they later replaced. The stipulation provides that for purposes of calculating the wife’s elective share, the gross estate is valued at $2,115,942.00; that the expenses paid to date, plus the amount reimbursable to the wife for administration expenses which she incurred, total $438,817.00. The parties agreed that the fees of their current attorneys and that of the guardian ad litem be fixed by the court.
The Issues of the Case:
Defendant Neptune Estates, LLC (“Neptune”), owner of 380 Neptune Avenue, Brooklyn,, NY (“Property”), entered a contractor’s agreement with defendant Big Poll Construction, Inc. (“Big Poll”) whereby Big Poll would act as the general contractor on a construction project on the Property (“Project”). In February 2009, plaintiff entered two subcontractor agreements with Big Poll whereby plaintiff agreed to perform the structural steel work, masonry, and concrete slabs on the Project.
A New York Probate Lawyer said that Neptune alleges that on or about February 22, 2009, Neptune removed Big Poll for cause and hired non-party Future City Plus, Inc. (“Future City”) to act as the new general contractor on the Project. A construction contract between Neptune and Future City was executed. On March 15, 2009, plaintiff entered two subcontractor agreements with Future City whereby plaintiff was to be paid $181,000 and $191,000, respectively, for the structural steel and masonry and concrete slabs on the Project. Neptune alleges that Future City subsequently terminated these subcontracts with plaintiff for cause on December 15, 2009.
Long Island Probate Lawyer said that, exactly nine months after Future City entered the contractor agreement with Neptune, plaintiff filed a mechanic’s lien (“January Lien”) against the Property and, pursuant to Lien Law § 9(3), plaintiff identified the person with whom the contract was made as “Big Poll & Son Construction, LLC and Future City Plus, Inc.”. After Neptune moved to discharge the January Lien, Justice Bunyan vacated the January Lien without prejudice in a short form order with the consent of the parties. The order indicated that “a new Mechanic’s Lien may be filed in a timely manner. This is without costs to any party.” On April 1, 2010, plaintiff filed a second mechanic’s lien (“Lien”) and identified the person with whom the contract was made as “Big Poll & Son Construction, LLC. There may be a claim against the successor on the project, Future City Plus, Inc., if this company agreed to assume the obligation of its predecessor.” This is the only substantive change from the January Lien other than the identity of the plaintiff’s attorney and the signatories to the Lien.
This is a matter being held in the Second Department, Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York and involves the probate of a will. The petitioner is appealing an order that was made in the Surrogate’s Court of Queens County on the 12th of January, 1960. The order denied her motion to strike out the appearance, authorization, and objections to probate that were filed by the respondent, the Public Administrator of Queens County.
Case Discussion
A New York Probate Lawyer said a special guardian was appointed by the court on behalf of the unknown distributees of the estate. The special guardian consented to act and filed objections to probate. The court directed service of citation upon the respondent. The respondent then filed a notice of appearance authorizing his attorney to appear in his place. The petitioner challenged the respondent’s status in this proceeding, which was confirmed by the Surrogate’s court act that allows the respondent to represent unknown persons in matters of probate.
This is a matter dealing with the probate of an estate. The case is being heard in the Second Department, Appellate Division, of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
The petitioner is appealing an order that was made in the Surrogates Court of Queens County. The order was issued on the 29th of April, 1986 and denied probate of the purported will on the ground of undue influence and fraud.
Case Background
New York Probate and Estate Administration Lawyer Blog