Probate & Estate Litigation

Published on: January 4, 2023

Surrogate’s Court found that the language of the will was clear and unambiguous, and that the testator’s intent was to benefit the George Ballas Trust. Matter of Estate of George Ballas, 2020 NY Slip Op 50978(U) (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2020)

by Stephen Bilkis

In New York, the standard for will construction is that the court will seek to determine the testator’s intent, based on the language used in the will. This is known as the “plain meaning” rule. The court will interpret the language of the will to give effect to the testator’s intent, using the words in their ordinary and commonly understood meanings.

If the language of the will is clear and unambiguous, the court will give effect to the plain meaning of the words used. However, if the language of the will is ambiguous or susceptible to more than one interpretation, the court may consider extrinsic evidence, such as the testator’s declarations, to determine his or her intent. Overall, the goal of will construction in New York is to determine the testator’s intent as accurately as possible, and to give effect to that intent to the greatest extent possible.

In the Matter of Estate of George Ballas the court was asked to interpret the terms of a will with respect to the distribution of the residuary estate.

Published on: January 2, 2023

Medical evidence not sufficient to show lack of capacity. Matter of Estate of Paul Tucker, 2020 NY Slip Op 31604(U) (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2020)

by Stephen Bilkis

Lack of capacity to make a will in New York refers to a situation where the testator (the person making the will) does not have the mental capacity to understand the nature and consequences of his or her actions when executing the will. In order to have the capacity to make a will in New York, the testator must have a general understanding of the nature and extent of his or her property, the natural objects of his or her bounty, and the effect of executing the will. Lack of capacity may result from a variety of factors, including mental illness, dementia, or other conditions that affect cognitive functioning.

In a will contest in New York, medical evidence can be used to prove that the testator lacked the capacity to execute the will. This may involve presenting medical records, expert testimony from treating physicians, or other evidence to establish the testator’s mental state at the time the will was executed. However, just like with any evidence, the court will determine whether it is sufficient.

Background

Published on: January 2, 2023

Court determined that allegations of undue influence were speculative and not substantiated. Niola v. Sarno, 939 N.Y.S.2d 553 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012)

by Stephen Bilkis

The contested probate case in Niola v. Sarno, 939 N.Y.S.2d 553 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012) involves Maria Capuano’s will and a dispute centered on allegations of fraud and undue influence. In the context of a will contest in New York, fraud involves the intentional use of deceptive practices to manipulate or mislead the testator in the creation or execution of a will. To substantiate a claim of fraud, an objectant must provide clear and convincing evidence that the proponent of the will knowingly made false statements or engaged in deceitful conduct, with the specific intent to influence the testator’s decisions regarding the distribution of their assets. Fraudulent actions may include misrepresentations about the will’s contents, the testator’s assets, or other relevant information, leading to a disposition of property that differs from the testator’s true intentions. Proving fraud in a will contest requires a high evidentiary standard to ensure the validity and integrity of the testamentary process.

In the context of a will contest in New York, undue influence refers to a situation where an individual exerts improper or coercive pressure on the testator, compelling them to create a will that reflects the influencer’s desires rather than the genuine intentions of the testator. To establish undue influence, an objectant must demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that the influencer engaged in conduct amounting to moral coercion, which significantly constrained the testator’s independent judgment and free will. This may involve tactics such as manipulation, intimidation, or exploitation of a confidential or fiduciary relationship. Courts scrutinize such claims closely, ensuring that the testator’s testamentary freedom remains intact and that the resulting will is a true reflection of the testator’s intentions rather than the product of external pressures.

Background Facts

Published on: December 28, 2022

Court of Appeals reversed decision related to whether a prenuptial agreement was unfair. In re Estate of Greiff, 703 N.E.2d 752 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1998)

by Stephen Bilkis

In the case of In re Estate of Greiff, the court was asked to determine if a prenuptial agreement that limited what a surviving spouse inherited was fair. The decision turned on who had the burden of proof of showing unfairness.

Background

Helen Greiff (plaintiff) and Herman Greiff married when Helen was 65 and Herman was 77. The Greiffs signed reciprocal prenuptial agreements that waived their respective surviving spousal rights in the event of the death of the other. Herman’s will left his entire estate to his children from a prior marriage (the children) (defendants). After Herman died, Helen filed a petition seeking a spousal share of Herman’s estate. The children objected based on the prenuptial agreements.

Published on: December 19, 2022

The administrator of a donor’s estate has standing to bring an action against the donee to enforce the terms of the gift. Smithers v. St. Luke’s-Roosevelt Hospital Center, 723 N.Y.S.2d 426 (2001)

by Stephen Bilkis

Whenever someone brings initiates a lawsuit, they must have standing to sue. Those with standing generally must have a financial interest in the matter. In Smithers v. St. Luke’s-Roosevelt Hospital Center, the Appellate Division had to determine if the administrator of an estate had standing to sue a donee to enforce the terms of a gift.

Background

In a June 16, 1971 letter to St. Luke’s-Roosevelt Hospital Center (Hospital) (defendant), R. Brinkley Smithers announced his intention to make a $10 million gift to the Hospital over time to establish an alcoholism treatment center. In the letter, he retained a veto power for himself over the center’s project plans and staff appointments. As it was Smithers’ intention that the treatment center be established in a separate facility, the Hospital purchased a building and opened the Smithers Alcoholism Treatment and Training Center (Center) in 1973.

Published on: December 14, 2022

Money in a joint account with right of survivorship presumably goes becomes the property of the surviving account owner upon the depositor’s death. In re Estate of Butta, 746 N.Y.S.2d 586 (2002)

by Stephen Bilkis

Not all property owned by decedent is probate property that is subject to the decedent’s will or intestate distribution. Property that is jointly owned by the decedent with another person withs survivorship rights typically becomes the property of the surviving account owner upon the death of the other account holder. This is a rebuttable presumption.

In the case of In re Estate of Butta, the Surrogate’s Court, Bronx County was asked to determine whether a bank account was held jointly out of convenience of if it was the intention of the depositor for the other account holder to gift the account to them.

Background

Published on: November 16, 2022

Surrogate’s Court determined that property transferred out of an estate and then recovered had not adeemed. In re Fitzsimmons, 43 Misc. 3d 483 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2014)

by Stephen Bilkis

Ademption occurs when property bequeathed under a will is no longer in the testator’s estate at the time of the testator’s death. In the case of In re Fitzsimmons, the court had to considered whether property that was wrongfully transferred from an estate prior to a testator’s death, but subsequently recovered after the death of the testator should be considered to have adeemed.

Background

In 1979, Lillian Hill, the decedent, and her husband William purchased the real estate that is the subject of this proceeding as tenants by the entirety. On February 3, 2003, after William’s death, the decedent executed a last will and testament. In it, she left the real property to her two daughters, Brenda and Marcia, in equal shares subject to a life estate given to Brenda. The residuary clause of the will provided that Brenda and Marcia each would share 50% of the net estate.

Published on: November 14, 2022

Surrogate’s Court refused to vacate a notice of deficiency issued by the NY Department of Taxation. In re the Estate of Cleary, 44 Misc. 3d 211 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2014)

by Stephen Bilkis

In this case the Surrogate’s Court was asked to determine the proper valuation of an asset that was part of a decedent’s estate for purposes of determining the amount tax owed to New York State. The executor of the estate, Sylvester Cleary, paid the amount that the Department of Taxation said that was owed. However, Cleary now seeks a refund of the payment.

Background

The decedent died on June 11, 2009 and letters testamentary were issued to the petitioner, Sylvester Cleary on August 31, 2009. The total value of the probate estate was $1,328,044.20. Included in the estate is a condominium, located in Westhampton Beach, New York, with a listed value of $600,000 and shares in a Forest Hills, New York cooperative apartment with a listed value of $350,000. According to the inventory submitted by Cleary, both of the properties were subject to life estates which, at the time the inventory was submitted, had not been valued. The owner of the life estates was a friend of the decedent, Ann Elizabeth DePuy. An agreement was executed between the decedent and DePuy granting her a life estate. The properties remained deeded to the decedent at the time of this death.

Published on: November 9, 2022

In determining who to appoint as fiduciary, the Surrogate’s Court gave deference to the fiduciary nominated by the agent of the testator. In re the Estate of Greenspon, 17 Misc. 3d 586 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2007)

by Stephen Bilkis

If a testator left a will, generally they would have indicated in the will who they want to serve as the executor of the estate. The executor, also referred to as the personal representative, serves a fiduciary and is charged with the job of settling the affairs of the decedent’s estate.

While other interested parties can petition the court to be named the fiduciary, courts give great deference to the person named by the testator in the will as that is the person the testator wanted for the job. However, for a variety of reasons, the nominated person may not be chose to or be able to serve in the role or other persons may feel they are a better fit for the role. If that happens, the court appoints another person and issues them letters of administration c.t.a. C.T.A means “Cum Testamento Annexo”- with the will annexed” or something added to the will.

In the case of In re the Estate of Greenspon, the Surrogate’s Court considered the issue of whether the court must give deference to the fiduciary selected by the agent of the testator rather than the testator himself.

Published on: November 7, 2022

Surrogate’s Court considered whether a nominated executor who objected to probate should be issued letters. In re Lublin, 43 Misc. 3d 721 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2013)

by Stephen Bilkis

Typically, the court will honor a testator’s choice of executor unless that person is determined to be ineligible. In the case of In re Lublin, the Surrogate’s Court was asked to consider another reason to circumvent the wish of a testator as memorialized in their will.

In the case of In re Lublin, the court considered an issue that was of first impression in New York. The issue was whether the testator’s choice of a preliminary executor must be honored where his actions make clear that he does not support the admission of the will to probate.

Background